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Abstract  
As National Security Advisor and (later) Secretary of State under Presidents 
Richard Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger was responsible for 
crafting policies aimed both at a diplomatic rapprochement with mainland China 
and seeking a strategic accommodation with the Soviet Union. However, many 
critics of this policy maintained that détente was a nouveau form of appeasement 
under an elaborate geopolitical scheme. One of the main targets of the Right was 
Kissinger who was believed to be the intellectual godfather of the Nixon and Ford 
foreign policy stratagems. 
This paper is a general analysis of the criticisms of Henry Kissinger in The 
National Review and The New Republic between 1970 and 1976. While their 
criticisms were salient among many voters and critics, writers often overstated and 
oversimplified many of the key areas of their disagreements with Kissinger on the 
overall détente policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From his arrival on the national political scene as an advisor to 
Nelson Rockefeller’s presidential   campaign in 1968 to serving as 
President Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor from 1969   to 
1973,  and during his tenure as the nation’s fifty sixth Secretary of 
State from 1973 to 1977,   Henry Kissinger was both a controversial 
figure and one of the most significant voices in   American foreign 
policy making.  A product of Harvard University, as well as a 
prominent   former faculty member, Kissinger’s views on the 
relationship between balance of power politics   to a pragmatic form 
of   Cold War diplomacy earned him admirers across the U.S.A.       
political spectrum. However, Kissinger’s practical and non-
ideological approaches to   international relations earned him his fair 
share of critics  who viewed his   diplomatic style as arrogant, naïve, 
and trending on a dangerous form of appeasement. 1   
  Whether the issues centered on the rapprochement to 
China, negotiating  arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, 
or his alleged ‘snubbing’ of Soviet dissident  Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, 
Kissinger’s critics were quick to point out  the fact that the  
Nixon/Kissinger approach had an expressed ‘proclivity to project 
regional  situations onto a global scale.’2 Similarly, his detractors 
claimed that Kissinger frequently  engaged in a cynical and self-
serving misreading of history in the formation of policy  
conclusions. This, coupled with Kissinger’s frequent use of 
diplomatic secrecy, was considered  both disingenuous and 
threatening to the vital security interests of the United States.3  
                                                 
1 Harvey Starr, “The Kissinger Years: Studying Individuals and Foreign Policy,” 
International Studies Quarterly, 24, 4, December (1980): 491; Steven F. Hayward, The 
Age of Reagan: The Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 1964-1980, (Roseville, California: 
Prima Publishing: 2001), 441. 
2 James Chace, “A Gravely Flawed Foreign Policy: The Kissinger Years,” New 
Republic,  9 November  (1974): 31, 33. 
3 Robert Hotz, “Editorial: The Case Against Kissinger,”Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 8 December (1975): 7; James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A 
History of the End of the Cold War (Viking: New York, 2009), 20-24; John Lewis 
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Moreover, Kissinger’s bold personal charisma was 
emblematic of the fallacy of his  approach to foreign relations. In 
short, he was viewed by many of his disparagers as a cynical  
opportunist. For instance, in one editorial in the Atlantic Monthly, 
Thomas Griffith stated that,  ‘Kissinger is a man fascinated by 
power, a student of it, a ruthless seeker of it, a respecter of  others 
who have it, a skilled wielder of it, and sometimes, alas, a man 
intoxicated by it.’  Griffith  also surmised that ‘[Kissinger] is an 
unabashed balance of power man who believes that ‘without  the 
ultimate sanction of power, conciliation becomes surrender’.4   
Furthermore, Kissinger was frequently accused of 
pretentiously casting himself in the  same intellectual/influential 
light as such great historical figures as Great Britain’s Viscount  
Robert Castlereagh and Austria’s Klemmens Von Metternich - of 
the 1815 Congress of Vienna  fame - as well as his own 
contemporary influential colleague, French President Charles De  
Gaulle.5 Such delusions and egomaniacal comparisons, Kissinger’s 
most vocal opponents  argued, were the sources of his policy 
construction. Many writers maintained that his inflated  persona 
enabled him to have undue influence on Presidents Richard Nixon 
and Gerald Ford,  endangering U.S. national security objectives even 
further.  
 At the forefront of much of the criticism aimed at 
Kissinger were well noted national  publications whose 
contemptuous musings pointed towards what the contributors 
believed to be  the essential failings of détente; of particular interest 
were The National Review and The New  Republic.   
                                                                                 
Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 184; 
Eric Patrick Gilliland, “Richard Nixon, Détente, and the Conservative Movement, 
1969-1974,” Master’s thesis, December 2006. 
4  Thomas Griffith, “Party of  One: Judging Kissinger,” Atlantic Monthly, July 
(1976): 22. 
5 Joseph Craft, “In Search of Kissinger,” Harper’s Magazine, January (1971): 58. 
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The former magazine was established in 1955 by conservative 
author and intellectual  William F. Buckley, Jr. For many decades, 
Buckley’s magazine served up a regular dose of  conservative pieces 
and served as a major conduit of intellectually based ideas for  the 
political and scholarly Right. While The New Republic, founded in 
1914, was not as  nearly conservative in its outlook as its younger 
counterpart, it nevertheless published works  that took a hard line 
stance on the pursuit of American foreign policy objectives. In many 
of the  works published by these two journals, historians are able to 
uncover a significant number of  harsh criticisms of Kissinger, as 
well as the collective fallacies that underscored them.    
 While the proverbial ‘buck’stopped in the Oval Office, 
Kissinger became the principal  symbol of the policies of the 
Nixon/Ford years as the presidency seemed embattled from the  
ravages of the post-Vietnam War era and the Watergate Scandal.6 
Thus, Henry Kissinger  receives a significant amount of criticism 
from many of the two journals’ more prolific writers.   
This study seeks to examine the criticisms of Henry Kissinger in 
those two influential  periodicals published throughout the 1970s. 
The research includes a general yet analytical  discussion of the 
ideological motivations underlying the vehement condemnation of 
his approach  to diplomacy. Contextually, this article focuses upon 
three distinct policy areas in which  Kissinger drew the heaviest 
criticisms from various writers ranging from its overall  approaches 
to U.S. foreign relations, the rapprochement with China, and U.S. 
Soviet relations  over Eastern Europe.  
Consequently, this article will contribute a historical and contextual 
dimension to the  literature on Henry Kissinger and his approach to 
foreign policy as it clearly points to how an  ideological and 
                                                 
6 Alastair Buchan, “The Irony of Henry Kissinger,” International Affairs, 50, 3, July 
(1974): 367. See also, Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American 
Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 193-201, 269-270; Jussi 
Hanhimaki,  The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 301. 
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pragmatic basis for criticism foreign policy decisions was often aired 
out in the  public light.  Likewise, it will also point out that this 
overly critical type of discourse was also  simplistic in its approach 
to the intricacies of late Cold War diplomacy, as later events clearly  
vindicated Kissinger’s approach to foreign policy crises and 
opportunities.   
 
Kissingerian Approaches to U.S. Foreign Relations 
The Cold War era policies of the Nixon and Ford Administrations 
were a significant  departure from that of the last Republican 
president, Dwight Eisenhower, in that Washington’s  bombastic 
confrontations with Moscow were not rooted in either nuclear 
brinksmanship or in  ideological dogma. Instead, the policies of the 
late 1960s to the mid 1970s were constructed on  mutual interests 
between East and West and the slow, but steady,  relaxation of 
tensions between  Foggy Bottom and the Kremlin. This 
experimental approach, critics argued, smacked of  appeasement but 
only under a fancy name: détente.7 And to them, this novel approach 
to  diplomacy was politically unacceptable and harmful to U.S.A. 
vital interests. However, the world  that Richard Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger inherited on January 29, 1969 was quickly evolving to  the 
point that a new approach would possibly meet the demands of the 
changing nature of  international politics. 
  The United States was losing the war in Vietnam. During the 1968 
campaign, Nixon  promised ‘peace with honor’, but not a unilateral 
retreat that would endanger U.S.A. diplomatic  credibility. In fact, 
the new West German Chancellor Willy Brandt began a policy 
specifically  aimed at improving relations with his country’s eastern 
counterpart in East Berlin. The Sino- Soviet split, which had been 
                                                 
7 For a thorough critique of the overall policy see Daniel Yergin, “In Faint Praise 
of  Détente,” The New Republic, 29 May (1976): 17-21;Robert Beisner, “History and 
Henry Kissinger,” Diplomatic History, 14 (1990, 525; Richard Stevenson, The Rise 
and Fall of Détente: Relaxations of Tension in U.S. Soviet Relations, 1953-84 (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 177.  
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simmering since Nikita Khrushchev’s famous speech denouncing  
the ‘crimes of Stalin’ in 1956, had reached a high point as a border 
dispute along the Ussuri  River region thirteen years later could have 
resulted in an all out war.   
It was into this rather contentious environment that 
National Security Advisor Henry  Kissinger began to plot his 
stratagems for a transformative foreign policy that relied less on  
overwhelming military superiority, but on exploiting new 
opportunities that could further the  U.S. geopolitical  interests.  The 
United States, he surmised, would continue to build upon the  
framework of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), the spirit of the 
1967 Glassboro Summit  between President Lyndon Johnson and 
Soviet President Alexis Kosygin, as well as the 1968  Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, by initiating the SALT talks aimed at reducing 
nuclear  stockpiles. Furthermore, the U.S.A. would maintain its 
diplomatic commitment to protecting the  sovereignty of Europe, 
while at the same time, having influence on the progress of West 
German  Chancellor Brandt’s Ostrpolitik of improving relations with 
its East German counterpart, albeit  on Washington’s terms.   
Consequently, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to end the war 
in Vietnam responsibly and  gradually while working towards a 
cordial policy with Beijing short of full diplomatic  recognition. 
Each of these policies would drive a proverbial wedge in the  Soviet-
based Eastern  alliance, thereby giving the United States an 
opportunity to extricate realistic diplomatic and  strategic 
concessions from the Communist Bloc. From Nixon and 
Kissinger’s perspective these  objectives were the essence of 
triangular diplomacy.8  
Kissinger’s critics in the printed press, however, had a different 
view. They held that  these policies smacked of naivety and pedantic 
pretention masked as sound diplomacy. Writing  for the New 
Republic, James Chace questioned the efficacy of the triangular 
                                                 
8 Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 703-732. 
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approach as failing  to answer key questions about the ultimate 
objective: to force the Communist Bloc and the   
Western World to abide by rules and norms established on neo-
Metternich approaches, where  such seemingly pretentious historical 
and contextual political parallels were sorely lacking.9   Moreover, 
Chace suggested that Kissinger’s own miscalculations regarding 
Soviet  intentions at the SALT bargaining table, the prolonging of 
the War in Vietnam, and general lack  of strategic planning had the 
net effect of resulting in a bungled and misdirected foreign policy.  
This phenomenon, coupled with Kissinger’s own (deliberate?) 
misreading of Charles DeGaulle’s  notion approaching détente with 
the Soviet Union from a gradual perspective, rather than  focusing 
upon cooperation as a starting point, made Kissinger’s motives not 
only suspect, but  potentially fatal to U.S. credibility in the long 
term. Chace concludes: 
While the Wilsonian zeal to remake the world in the American 
image too often characterized our actions in the era of the Cold 
War, we must also guard against pursuing a policy in Kissinger’s 
own words, ‘empty of vision and humanity.’ Not to transcend the 
excessively pragmatic can give rise to a policy mired in expediency, 
with incalculable destructive costs. Henry Kissinger once wrote in 
his study of 19th Century diplomacy that ‘the acid test of a policy, 
however, is its ability to obtain domestic support.’ He was wrong. 
The true test of a foreign policy is not of its short term support but 
its long term consequences.10 
From Chace’s perspective, Kissinger’s dubious and bookish foreign 
policy served a golden opportunity to engage in an esoteric 
intellectual exercise. 
The New Republic’s John Osborne was no less critical of this unique 
style of diplomacy  even in the early days when Kissinger served as 
the President’s National Security Advisor. In a  1970 article he not 
only accused Kissinger of being an arrogant technocrat, but of being 
                                                 
9 James Chace, “A Gravely Flawed Foreign Policy: The Kissinger Years,”   31, 33. 
10 Chace, “A Gravely Flawed Foreign Policy: The Kissinger Years,”  31, 33. 
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an  overbearing ogre. Osborne argued that Kissinger not only 
overshadowed Secretary of  State William Rogers, but that he had 
made it his stock and trade to sabotage Rogers’ role and to  
micromanage United States foreign policy objectives to suit his 
intellectual fancy. Osborne  maintains: 
Kissinger has served Nixon, as among other things, his surrogate 
brutalitarian. Whether the President has really given foreign policy 
‘a new direction’ is questionable. But there can be no question that 
the brutality has had much if not all of the desired effect upon its 
principal target, the bureaucracy of the Department of State. A 
humbler and more quiescent lot of departmental officials is not to 
be found in Washington.  
He adds: 
[State] Department officers who all but hissed when they said 
‘Kissinger’ now speak of  ‘Henry’ in the tone of intimacy that is 
heard when members of his own staff talk about him. The 
department bureaucracy has recognized the fact that ‘Henry’ is 
indeed a surrogate, speaking and acting for the President along lines 
and through organizational channels that Nixon conceived for 
himself and authorized Kissinger to implement in structural detail. 
‘This is the way the President wants it,’ State’s people tell each 
other. The nature of officialdom being what it is, what a President is 
known to want is more acceptable than anything a mere staff 
subordinate, however eminent, is supposed to want.11 
Thus, Osborne suggested that major decisions ranging from the 
SALT Talks, the formulation  of a “China paper”, and the Arab-
Israeli conflict to smaller tasks (e.g. coordinating routine  meetings 
of key national security staff) would become part and parcel of a 
Kissingerian power  grab.12 
 The National Review’s Richard Whalen addressed similar concerns 
about what he  considered Kissinger’s grandiosity and flawed 
                                                 
11  John Osborne, “The Nixon Watch: Henry’s Wonderful Machine,” The New 
Republic, 31 January (1970):12-13. 
12 Osborne, “The Nixon Watch: Henry’s Wonderful Machine,” 12-13. 
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diplomacy. In a September 14, 1973 column  written during the 
height of the Watergate Scandal, he leveled criticism that linked 
negative  perceptions of the Nixon presidency to the notion that the 
country’s national security interests  were consequently vulnerable.  
He writes: 
The Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy is the kinkiest since Franklin 
Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins redrew the map of the world upstairs 
at the White House. The latter pair at least had the excuse of a 
global war for their oversights and in any event they admitted to 
being amateurs. Nixon and Kissinger, the coolly professional 
technicians, are bumblers on a far grander scale. They have 
conceived and executed in deepest secrecy a policy avowedly based 
on enduring national interests, yet characterized by sudden and 
sometimes ruthlessly unpredictable spasms of unilateral whim. They 
have detached themselves from the American public, the Congress, 
the foreign policy establishment, and many of our allies, and have 
behaved in a manner more appropriate to a totalitarian state than a 
democratic republic at the heart of a worldwide security and 
economic system.13 
In essence, Whalen maintained that the policies of the 
Nixon/Kissinger years could be described as steeped in deceit, laced 
with cheeky grandiosity, and peppered with a cynical secrecy so vast 
that U.S.A. ideals were obfuscated by political expediency.  
Furthermore, Whalen characterized Henry Kissinger as Nixon’s 
‘one-man foreign  ministry’ in order to place the entire onus on the 
execution of such failed objectives on the  Secretary of State. Hence, 
he described Kissinger in the most virulent of terms as ‘an  
Unassimilated - a European  by heritage and cultural choice, a 
cosmopolitan by circumstance, an  American by deliberate (and 
hazardous) calculation.’ 14 Hence, he concludes that Kissinger’s  
détente only emboldened Soviet expansionist aims and allowed the 
                                                 
13 Richard J. Whalen, “A Foreign Policy without A Country,” National Review, 13 
September (1973): 1005. 
14 Whalen, “A Foreign Policy without A Country,”  1005. 
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Chinese to become  opportunistic parasites on the U.S.A.’ good will, 
thus threatening the stability of the international  order even further. 
 
Betrayal and Naivety: The Rapprochement with China 
 President Richard Nixon’s dramatic opening to China in 1972 was 
considered by many  writers as the flagrant betrayal of one national 
friend, Taiwan, and the embracing of a  sworn enemy, Mao Tse-
tung. This diplomatic venture, coupled with their general  unease 
about the SALT Talks with the Soviets, gave the impression that 
Nixon’s (read:  Kissinger’s) diplomatic style was based upon naivety 
and thus set a dangerous diplomatic  precedent in future dealings 
with the Communist world.15 
Perhaps some of the most scathing criticisms of Kissinger came in 
the Summer and Fall  of 1971 when as National Security Advisor, he 
secretly traveled to Beijing in June to meet with  his counterpart, 
Chou En Lai, to begin the process of easing tensions between their 
two countries  and to arrange a possible visit by President Nixon. 
The intent of this visit would be to bridge the  vast diplomatic gap 
between the U.S. and China, thus capitalizing on the Sino-Soviet 
split and  forcing the Soviet Union to make greater concessions at 
the arms control bargaining table. This  intricate and neo-
Metternichian form of wedge politics was considered by many of 
the  Administration’s supporters (especially liberal Democrats and 
moderate Republicans) to be   Kissinger’s diplomatic genius at is 
zenith. 
                                                 
15 See, Jussi Hanhimaki,  The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign 
Policy, 300; Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2007), 303-305; Norman A. Graebner, “Henry Kissinger and American 
Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Appraisal,” Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
22, 1, 28 June (2008): 12; Harvey Starr, “The Kissinger Years: Studying Individuals 
and Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly, 24, 4 December (1980): 491; Phil 
Williams, “The Limits of American Power: From Nixon to Reagan,” International 
Affairs, 63, 4, Autumn (1987):, 576-577. 
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However, many opinion writers found this particular mission to be 
problematic for two  key reasons.  First, it deeply troubled 
conservative columnists whose zeal motivated them to  admonish 
the Administration for cavorting with an untrustworthy Moscow 
(and Beijing) thus  betraying American ideals.16  This would mean 
(at best) the leadership of the U.S. kowtowing to  an avowed enemy 
or (at worse) the visit could lead to full diplomatic recognition to the 
chagrin  of Taipei.17 And secondly, this risky approach to China, 
many critics alleged, was based upon the  same faulty premises as 
was détente with the Soviet Union; the notion that Beijing would 
also  “play nice” with the United States.18   
But perhaps the most galling aspect of this strategy was the tightly 
knit secrecy involved  in the planning and execution of Kissinger’s 
1971 trip to Beijing. In their opinion such a mission  fraught with 
risks that would undercut U.S.A. credibility should the overall 
objective towards  rapprochement fall short. In fact, one writer for 
the National Review alleged that Kissinger had  played the fool to 
Mao and Chou as the Chinese government and media issued hateful 
criticisms  of the U.S.A. in their media during and after Kissinger’s 
visit. Opinion writer Karl Baarslag wrote an article, “Peking’s Other 
Face” that essentially accused Kissinger of being made a dupe by the 
Chinese and forever tarnishing the nation’s credibility. Moreover, he 
reported that Chinese radio and television broadcasts were accusing 
the United States of murdering innocent Vietnamese citizens and 
called President Nixon, a ‘belligerent god of plague’ and an 
‘imperialist gangster.’ 19 Thus, Baarslag concluded, that Beijing was 
totally untrustworthy and that Kissinger was critically naïve. 
                                                 
16 Anne H. Cahn, Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA, (University Park, PA: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 26-27. 
17 Hanhimaki,  The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, 166-
168;  
18 Williams, “The Limits of American Power: From Nixon to Reagan,” 576-577. 
19 Karl Baarslag, “Peking’s Other Face,” National Review, 10 September (1971): 
991, 1007. 
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 The National Review’s Founder William F. Buckley, Jr. echoed 
similar concerns on  purely diplomatic and strategic grounds. Long a 
supporter of Taiwan and its longtime leader  Chiang Kai-shek, 
Buckley expressed tremendous angst as he perceived that the special  
relationship that Washington had with Taipei was about to be 
sacrificed on the altar of détente,  and that the “China seat” on the 
United Nations Security Council was going to be awarded to an  
intransigent adversary. Additionally, Buckley’s critique was similar to 
Baarslag’s in the sense  that he maintained the Kissinger was made 
the foil by Chou and that the U.S. received nothing in  return during 
its secret talks in Beijing, particularly over the ‘One China policy’ 
and the UN  question.  Buckley writes: 
It is clear that the objective of the Nixon Administration, at this 
point, is détente with Red China. If we have reason to believe 
that Red China will be ultimately intransigent, then there is 
reason to put less than total pressure on Taiwan. In other words, 
there is official reason to hope, however surreptitiously, that 
Taiwan will indeed walk out of the UN, leaving moot the 
question of kicking her out. That way, the U.S. Government 
would have put up a public fight for her old friend, and, 
lugubriously, lost; because of our friend’s obduracy. And Red 
China….having won the day. 20 
In his continuing swipe at Kissinger regarding shifting 
Nixon/Kissinger’s shifting policy toward  Taipei and new 
relationship with Beijing, Buckley concludes, “If we really desire 
Taiwan out,  that means that at Peking, Chou En-lai did not give 
Henry Kissinger even one one-hundredth of a  bloom.”21 
 Similarly, the editorial board of The New Republic, intoned that the 
Kissinger trip was  emblematic of the Nixon Administration’s 
overall misdirected idealism in its embrace of China,  and its 
rejection of Taiwan’s decades’ long friendship. Without directly 
                                                 
20 William F. Buckley, Jr., “On the Right: The Secretary of State Marches On.” 
National Review, September 24, 1971, 948. 
21 William F. Buckley, Jr., “On the Right: The Secretary of State Marches On,” 
948. 
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mentioning Kissinger by  name, the journal charged that this gutsy 
form of reconciliation lacked a realistic perspective on  the great 
antagonism that Washington and Beijing had carried against each 
other since 1949, and  that to pursue improved relations on the basis 
of a secret and short meeting was a mistake. It  writes:  
Twenty-two years of mutual hostility are not to be blown away by 
the first breeze. National interests long considered antagonistic are 
not to be reconciled quickly. It was only four years ago that 
Secretary of State (Dean) Rusk, defending a hold-fast position in 
Vietnam, warned that ‘within the decade or two, there will be a 
billion Chinese on the mainland, armed with nuclear weapons, with 
no certainty about what their attitude will be.’ He found it ominous 
to contemplate the world cut in two by Asian communism, reaching 
out throughout Southeast Asia. 22 
In this dire warning, the editors of The New Republic suggested that 
the ‘Red’ Chinese could not be totally trusted and that the Nixon 
Administration should precede in relations with Beijing with 
extreme caution. 
Indeed, President Nixon’s trip to China in late February, 1972 
signaled a new direction  for détente in that Washington and Beijing 
were at least on speaking terms and it forced the  Soviet Union to 
take the SALT talks seriously enough to make some key 
concessions. The  mission also emboldened the Nixon re-election 
campaign to promote the image of Nixon as  peacemaker, and it 
promoted Henry Kissinger as a brilliant strategist, tactician and 
diplomat,  much to the vexation of various writers. 23 
 
 
                                                 
22 “Agenda in Peking,” The New Republic, August 7& 14 (1971): 7. 
23 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 
616-617; Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, 154-155; Gregory D. Cleva, Henry 
Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy, (Cranbury, NJ: Associated 
University Presses, 1989), 184-185. 
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Solzhenitsyn, Helsinki, and the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine 
After the Watergate scandal resulted in Nixon’s resignation and Vice 
President Gerald  Ford’s ascendency to the White House, Secretary 
of State Kissinger would be personification of  the major foreign 
policy decisions of the new administration, making him fodder for 
his  journalistic critics who watched his every move. In 1975 when 
Kissinger offered strong advice  that President Ford should refuse 
to meet with the prominent anti-Communist writer and Nobel  
Prize laureate  Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, it became the center of a 
major controversy that a few  writers held to be a major fallacy of 
Kissinger’s thinking and diplomatic practice, one that they  felt gave 
Moscow an edge in East/West relations.  
Of particular consternation to conservatives were Secretary 
Kissinger’s stern 1975  recommendations to President Gerald Ford 
that he not meet with Soviet author and dissident  Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn prior to attending the Helsinki Conference. 
Solzhenitsyn was a virulent  critic of what he perceived to be 
Moscow’s disregard for human rights, as well as being an  
unwavering critic of détente; as such, to give him a high level meeting 
with Ford could  possibly jeopardize the President’s  position in 
negotiating with the Soviets. His primary work,  Gulag Archipelago, 
published in 1973 was a revealing look into the harsh environment 
in Soviet  labour camps. As a dissident who frequently criticized 
Western accommodation with Moscow,  and given his stature as a 
Nobel laureate, his opinion, it was surmised, would help to  shape a 
much needed consensus as to why détente was a failure.24 Thus, a few 
                                                 
24  See, “The Strangled Cry of Solzhenitsyn,” The National Review, 29 August 
(1975): 929-934. Here, the editors of this journal (read Buckley) allowed a speech 
that Solzhenitsyn gave to the AFL-CIO to be published in full. In one critical 
passage of the speech, he says, ‘The cold war---the war of hatred - is still going on, 
but only on the Communist side. What is the cold war? It’s a war of abuse---and 
they still abuse you. They trade with you, they sign agreements and treaties, but 
they still abuse you, they still curse you. In sources which you can read, and even 
more in those which are unavailable to you, and which you don’t hear of, in the 
depths of the Soviet Union, the cold war has never stopped. It hasn’t stopped for 
a second.’ 936. 
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print were  outraged that Kissinger made such a recommendation 
and that Ford followed it because  Solzhenitsyn was considered 
(along with the noted scientist Andre Sakharov) to be the voice of  
conscience and a symbol of the continual abuses of the Soviet 
Union’s post-Stalin era.25  However, in a column in the 
National Review, William Buckley allowed the entire  Solzhenitsyn 
address to be published in full, quoting an article in the London Times 
in his  ‘Editor’s Note’: ‘And it is he, and those who read or hear his 
witness, and who invite him to  speak or applaud him when he does 
so, and who protest when the niceties of diplomacy prevent  the 
President of the United States from offering his symbolic hospitality 
- it is these whom I at  any rate today salute.’ While never 
mentioning Kissinger by name, Buckley’s back handed insult  was 
poignantly clear.26 
Nevertheless, the opinion writers of the National Review and New 
Republic were  especially angry with both Secretary Kissinger and 
President Ford for signing the 1975 Helsinki  Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. This accord signaled tacit 
Western  recognition of the Soviet territorial gains made during 
World War Two and their vast political and military influence over 
its Eastern European satellite states.27 At this juncture, noted writers  
considered the U.S.A’ recognition of post-World War Two borders 
dominated by Moscow to be  utterly unacceptable.28 
 The ferocious uproar over Helsinki proved to be a major source of 
criticism over the  Ford/Kissingerian approach to U.S. /Soviet 
relations. In Walter Isaacson’s (1992) classic study  of Kissinger. 
Here, he likened the negative reaction to the Helsinki Accords to the 
same anger  over President Franklin Roosevelt’s alleged capitulation 
                                                 
25 Coral Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era, (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1977), 213-214. 
26 Buckley, “The Strangled Cry of Solzhenitsyn,” 929. 
27 Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, 189-191; Leo P. Ribuffo, “Is Poland A 
Soviet Satellite? Gerald Ford, the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, and the Election of 
1976,” Diplomatic History, 14 ,3, 1 June (2007): 385-404; Cleva, Henry Kissinger and 
the American Approach to Foreign Policy, 197. 
28 Griffith, “Party of  One: Judging Kissinger,” 23. 
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to Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin at the  Yalta Conference some thirty 
years before.29 But Harvey Starr’s 1984 analysis of Helsinki was  
even more striking and mirrored much of the well touted line. He 
wrote, “The possibility of  political and military confrontation in 
Europe would be enhanced, and the situation become  unstable and 
dangerous in Kissinger’s conception of world order.” 30  
It is important to note, that the writers of the New Republic 
and National Review waited until an opportune time to issue their 
critique of both détente and Helsinki as they were both considered 
linked to a larger schema of foreign policy naivety. 
Consequently, the collective furor over Solzhenitsyn, the 
controversy over Helsinki, and disclosure of remarks about the 
sought after “organic” relationship between the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe made by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger’s chief 
political aide in the State Department, placed both President Ford 
and Secretary Kissinger in the proverbial crosshairs as the 1976 
elections approached. 
In a December, 1975 ‘closed door meeting’ with diplomats in 
London, Sonnenfeldt said  that the United States must come to 
grips with the fact that the Soviet Union was indeed a  permanent 
fixture in Eastern Europe and that it was the Ford Administration’s 
intention to put an  end to what he considered the ‘inorganic, 
unnatural relationship between Moscow and its  satellite states.’31  
The details of Sonnenfeldt’s remarks were made public in the 
American press in April,  1976 just as the contentious Republican 
primary race between President Ford and   California Governor 
Ronald Reagan, a fervent critic of détente, had reached a critical 
                                                 
29 Walter Issacson, Kissinger: A Biography, (New York: Touchstone, 1992), 661. 
30  Harvey Starr, Kissinger, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 
72. 
31 Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History 189; Sonnenfeldt was more specific when 
he says, ‘So it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the 
relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union,’ quoted in 
Issacson, Kissinger: A Biography,  664. 
A Fear and Loathing of Détente – Brian Clardy 
130 
phase.  Reagan was perhaps the sharpest critic of Sonnenfeldt’s 
remarks, noting that it was emblematic  of the Ford 
Administration’s propensity to capitulate to Soviet demands, that 
the marginalization  of Solzhenitsyn and Helsinki made 
Sonnenfeldt’s remarks even more poignant. The implication  being, 
according to Reagan, that ‘slaves should accept their fate.’32 
True to form, the writers from The National Review and The New 
Republic were all too enthusiastic to establish the critical link between 
Helsinki and Ford and Kissinger’s seeming  inability to ‘train the 
bear.’ In the former journal, James Burnham wrote a most articulate 
and  logically progressive criticism of Helsinki and the Sonnenfeldt 
Doctrine by intimating that the  policies were constructed along a 
faulty and flimsy logic that presupposed that stability in  East/West 
relations could only ensue once the U.S.A. acceded to Soviet 
demands unilaterally. In a twist of supreme sarcasm, He posits: 
Two primary strategies will further this policy: We should expand 
mutual trade relations, granting the Soviet Union most favored-
nation status and adequate credits, and facilitating large scale Soviet 
entry into our domestic market. We should help shift the 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the East European 
nations from its present unnatural basis in crude force to a natural, 
organic basis. The transformed relationship will incorporate both 
the Soviet primacy deriving from geopolitical reality and the 
national identities of the East European countries. So transformed, 
the Soviet superpower will no longer be subject to the tensions that 
threaten to set off world war and will be able to focus on the 
improvement of its domestic economy in harmony with the global 
economy. Thus: Peace and prosperity.33 
By critically assessing the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine in light of the 
presupposed appeasement at  Helsinki, Burnham provided one of 
the key insights to how they perceived that Ford and  Kissinger had 
bungled U.S. foreign policy objectives. Here, the implication was 
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clear.  While President Ford defeated Governor Reagan (barely) 
to achieve the Republican  presidential nomination, the issue of 
Helsinki and the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine continued to haunt  him 
throughout his campaign against the Democratic nominee, former 
Georgia governor  Jimmy Carter. The New Republic’s John Osborne 
readily pounced on President Ford’s gaffe  during a presidential 
debate in San Francisco that there was ‘no Soviet domination of 
Eastern  Europe.’ Osborne also suggested that Kissinger stayed in 
Washington so as not to give the  perception that he was the true 
brains behind Ford’s foreign policy. Just the same, Osborne made  
the connection as he seemed to gloat over the President’s fatal slip 
of the tongue. He writes: 
The President has been drenched for two years in the subtleties of 
Henry Kissinger’s view that the US had to recognize the Soviet 
presence in Eastern Europe as a fact without either condoning it or 
condemning it. He got a renewed dose of it from Kissinger and 
[National Security Council Advisor Lieutenant General Brent] 
Scowcroft in San Francisco. He was urged to defend the 
controversial 1975 Helsinki Agreement---attacked by Carter and 
Ronald Reagan among others, as craven recognition by the US by 
Soviet mastery---on the ground that it actually forbade further 
Soviet military aggression in Europe.34 
In Osborne’s calculus, the political damage was done: Ford would 
be easily defeated in  November because the American voter could 
readily draw the nexus between a bumbling  candidate, a sinister and 
manipulative subordinate, and a failed foreign policy. Perhaps, this  
connection, Osborne concludes, was the greatest single monument 
to the failures of détente. 
 
Analysis 
 Collectively, the musings of Kissinger’s critics in both the New 
Republic and the National Review make the key and critical linkage to 
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his diplomatic style, penchant for secrecy,  neo-Metternichian 
pretentions, and personal opportunism. Moreover, many of those 
writers  accused him of having undue influence over the crafting of 
U.S. foreign policy objectives in a  way that placed national security 
objectives in great jeopardy. The policy of détente, it was  suggested, 
was the blanket reversal of nearly twenty plus years of bipartisan 
consensus to contain  Soviet ‘aggression’ and to maintain close ties 
with Taipei, thus holding ‘Red China’ at bay.  
These opinion makers strongly argued that the Soviet Union’s 
presence in Eastern Europe  was problematic as millions of citizens 
were held as ‘slaves’ ( to borrow from Ronald Reagan),  and that 
Helsinki and the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine was a cruel and maniacal 
policy that continued  that ‘enslavement.’ Moreover, the snubbing of 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was indeed part of a  cynical scheme to 
marginalize a significant anti-Soviet voice in the name of political 
expediency  and that this was a betrayal of core Western democratic 
values. 
 Hence, the core of much of the criticism of détente and the 
rapprochement to  China in those two journals pointed to a 
wholesale character flaw in Henry Kissinger. However,  there were a 
number of factors that many of those writers failed to consider in 
their critique that  greatly weakened their overall policy-based 
arguments.  For example, these writers consistently maintained 
that Kissinger’s détente policy  signaled a willingness for the United 
States to capitulate to Soviet demands in the overall  strategic global 
order, e.g. arms control, trade, and human rights. Likewise, their 
approach to  U.S.A.-Soviet relations was weak and unilateral, making 
Washington vulnerable to blackmail; that  détente was ‘a one way 
street.’35 This strategy, the writers observed, would embolden 
Moscow to act precipitously against American interests in Western 
Europe and elsewhere. In those articles, especially those penned by 
James Chace, Richard Whalen, and James Burnham,  Kissinger was 
the dangerous culprit whose propensity towards diplomatic 
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concealment, disdain  for bureaucracy (and his perceived arrogant 
demeanor) endangered U.S credibility. Undeniably,  those writers 
yearned for a return to the type of hard-nose diplomacy that was 
practiced by  Kissinger’s predecessors: Marshall, Acheson, Dulles, 
and Rusk. 
 As for the claim that Kissinger’s reliance on secrecy was evident of 
his flawed character,  the writers ( especially Whalen) failed to 
comprehend the historical fact that a critical ingredient  of 
diplomacy is the occasional need for pragmatic discretion. 
Kissinger’s perceptive knowledge  of the need for infrequent secrecy 
in diplomatic matters allowed the Nixon and Ford  Administrations 
to enact their policies more effectively, thus pragmatically 
maintaining the  element of surprise and keeping the goal of 
extracting greater concessions from Moscow at the  negotiating 
table would be the desired result.  Time and again the National 
Review and New Republic’s columnists (especially Whalen)  completely 
oversimplified the changing dynamics of the Cold War during the 
early 1970s. To be  sure, the Soviet Union had reached strategic 
nuclear parity with the United States by the late  1960s but the 
likelihood of those weapons being used in anger was far less than it 
was a decade  prior, i.e. the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Thus, 
Washington and Moscow understood that the  outbreak of a major 
war in Europe (over Berlin especially) or over a larger global conflict 
would  be an act of mutual suicide.  
Hence, Washington and Moscow began to defuse such a possibility 
with the 1963  Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty of 1968, and by engaging in  serious arms 
control talks in the atmosphere of Glassboro. As a group, those 
inquisitive wordsmiths failed to comprehend the fact that 
brinksmanship, both as a policy and an overall  approach to 
East/West relations, was no longer a viable option; that on both 
sides the risks for  thermonuclear conflagration were too terrible to 
contemplate. 
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 Columnists like Buckley, Baarslag, and the editorial board of The 
New  Republic strongly condemned the secrecy of Kissinger’s visit to 
Beijing in June signaled the  possible restoration of normalized 
relations between the United States and ‘Red China.’ To be  sure, 
Kissinger was accused of misreading the essence of the Sino-Soviet 
split and acting in a  haphazard manner that could jeopardize the 
security of Taiwan, and provide Beijing a pretext to  make 
unreasonable demands on Washington in the areas of diplomacy 
and trade.  
In their collective calculus, Henry Kissinger was cavorting 
with the personification of evil, Mao Tse-tung. In this regard, the 
columnists argued, Kissinger’s actions were both disingenuous to a 
trusted ally and frightfully naïve.   
Of all of the written criticisms of Kissinger’s visit to China, 
Baarslag’s article seemed the  most cynical in its approach. It begged 
the question of where (and how) he received information  from 
China’s wire services and radio transmissions mocking Kissinger and 
Nixon, when China  was in the middle of the  Cultural Revolution, 
where anti-Western propaganda was frequently  touted.  Granted, he 
cited various quotes from statements allegedly made by Chinese 
officials in  the “Peking Service in English” from early July, 1971 as 
his primary source, he failed to interpret  those comments within 
proper thematic context.  
 In addition, the writers maintained that the greatest failing of 
Kissingerian détente was highlighted by the marginalization of a 
prophetic anti-Soviet voice (Solzhenitsyn) and the virtual surrender 
of Eastern Europe to its Russian ‘slave masters’: their bitter reaction 
to the Sonnenfeldt  doctrine.   
As a consequence, columnists James Burnham and John Osborne 
failed to take into  consideration that a public meeting between Ford 
and Solzhenitsyn would have sent the  proverbial wrong message to 
Moscow that Washington would take a harder line in East/West  
diplomacy, thus endangering the talks in Helsinki, talks involving a 
possible second SALT  treaty, and the overall tone of U.S.A.- Soviet 
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relations. Meanwhile, the Sonnenfeldt doctrine, while politically 
disastrous to President Ford’s primary and general election bids, was 
only the recognition of what had been apparent since 1945: that the 
Soviet Union had a strong presence in Eastern Europe and simply 
wishing it away through continued non-recognition would not put 
an end to the occupation, their expressed and tacit angst 
notwithstanding. 
 While well intentioned, the writers of The National Review and The 
New Republic tended to oversimplify and overstate their persistent 
criticisms of the détente policy. But what’s more, their negative and 
personal assessment of Henry Kissinger was at once demonizing 
and spiteful.  
CONCLUSION 
 While this article discussed the most serious criticisms of Kissinger 
in two influential  journals, this subject is far from exhaustive. In 
fact, this is the beginning of a major research  project of similar 
ideological critiques of détente (and the intellectual godfather who 
promoted it)  in daily newspapers, popular magazines, and public 
speeches. The amount material on this  topic is tremendous and it 
will be the task of diplomatic and journalistic historians to uncover  
this data and view it through the lens of practical analysis. 
 In this respect can the historical record regarding the Kissingerian 
record be made clear  and lucid, not to mention the journalists and 
writers who covered it. However, the scholar  of both  diplomatic 
history and printed media must be careful not to fall into the trap of  
revisionism or the follies of contemporary political discourse. 
Instead, the historian must employ  a pragmatic research 
hermeneutic that realistically assesses the claims made by 
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